Sulayman Bowles
Back to writing

Financial systems

SH 130 bankruptcy: the road survived, and its owners changed

Debt paid for 84% of the $1.328 billion project. The company was in Chapter 11 from 2016 to 2017, and drivers kept paying tolls.

Monochrome generative point study “Hollow Crown,” a mathematical form rendered in black and white.

SH 130 Concession Company filed for Chapter 11 on March 2, 2016, and emerged on June 28, 2017. The bankruptcy reorganized the company financing and operating southern Segments 5–6. Texas retained public title, the concession continued and drivers continued paying tolls. The financing failed while the operating road continued. U.S. DOT project record; TxDOT agreement archive.

Original funding included $685.8 million of senior bank loans, a $430 million federal TIFIA loan, $209.8 million of equity, and $2.3 million of interest income.

Method & limits

This account follows the original financing and June 2017 recoveries. An equity percentage requires an equity valuation before it can be compared with a cash recovery. Primary documents checked October 26, 2026.

Debt supplied 84% of original funding

The federal project profile records the initial construction financing, whose loan balances can move before bankruptcy as interest, fees, amortization, and later borrowing change the amounts outstanding. The original listed financing adds to $1,327.9 million, which rounds to DOT’s $1.328 billion project cost. Debt supplied $1,115.8 million, or 84.0% of that listed funding. Those percentages are calculated here from the source amounts.

The May 19, 2017 company announcement described a committed $260 million senior secured facility led by Goldman Sachs. CRS reported a federal recovery of $15 million cash, $87 million debt, and 34% of reorganized equity. The instruments have different risks, so their face amounts can’t price the whole recovery.

SH 130 Segments 5–6: original financing versus the 2017 reorganization
Claim or rightOriginal financing / sponsors2017 outcome
Public roadway titleState of TexasState of Texas; title did not become creditor property
Concession company equityCintra and Zachry original ventureCreditor ownership; CRS reports a 34% federal stake at restructuring
Senior project debt$685.8m bank loansIssuer announced a $260m new senior secured facility
Federal TIFIA claim$430m direct loanCRS: $15m cash + $87m debt + 34% equity
Private equity funding$209.8m original investmentReplaced by the reorganized ownership; original funding is not a promised recovery
Other original funding$2.3m interest incomeNot a loan or an equity claim to carry into the new stack

USD millions. Left: original project funding; allowed bankruptcy claims can differ. Right: the 2017 transaction, predating present-day balances.

Case 01 / SH 130Road survives; equity changes
2007–2016Original concession
Equity
Cintra 65% / Zachry 35%
Senior banks
$685.8M
TIFIA
$430M
Private equity
$209.8M
March 2016Chapter 11

Early toll revenue ran more than 60% below original forecasts.

June 2017 onwardReorganized concession
Control
SVP-controlled vehicle
Federal recovery
Subordinated debt + equity
Dated estimate
65% / 32% / 4% other (2Q 2024; rounded)
State title
Unchanged
The original equity was eliminated, creditors received new claims, and the road continued operating. Current materials support an SVP-controlled majority and a federal minority; the more granular 2Q 2024 estimate is date-qualified and rounds to 101%.SourcesU.S. DOT financing recordFHWA reportDated pension memorandum

Creditor ownership left public title intact

Texas held the road title. The company held finite concession rights and duties. Lenders and shareholders held company claims. Reorganization changed the third relationship while preserving the first two.

The original TIFIA lien sat behind senior bank debt and ahead of equity. CRS says the springing-lien rule brought it to parity with other creditors in bankruptcy. That rule changed the priority relevant to the court outcome.

Public title stays above the capital stack
State of TexasPublic roadway title · concession counterparty
SH 130 Concession CompanyOperate, maintain and collect tolls on Segments 5–6

Original funding

$685.8m senior bank loans

$430.0m federal TIFIA loan

$209.8m private equity

2017 reorganization

$260m new senior facility

$87m debt + $15m cash federal recovery

34% equity federal stake at restructuring

Sources: U.S. DOT original financing, issuer’s May 2017 facility announcement and CRS’s September 2017 recovery account. Original funding is not the petition-date claims balance. The two columns do not assert a dollar-for-dollar recovery.

Traffic can miss a fixed debt schedule

The March 2016 court filing, pages 4–5, describes failed out-of-court negotiations and potential defaults on the senior facility and swaps. Drivers could choose other routes; the scheduled financing payments stayed. Equity was the cushion beneath more than $1.1 billion of project loans.

Restructuring can reduce payments through lower balances, longer maturities, changed priority, or creditor equity. It can’t manufacture traffic. The federal lender’s exposure also shows how private project financing can carry public financial risk alongside public roadway title.

Cash and debt covered 23.7% of original TIFIA principal

The $15 million cash payment was 3.5% of the original $430 million TIFIA loan. The $87 million debt face amount was another 20.2%. Together they equal $102 million, or 23.7% of original loan principal, before assigning any value to equity. This calculation deliberately uses the original loan as its denominator; it is not the court’s allowed-claim recovery rate.

The remaining 34% stake refers to residual equity. Calculating its value as 34% of the original loan or gross toll revenue would use the wrong base. If the reorganized company’s total equity were worth E, the stake would be worth 0.34 × E before any differences in voting or distribution rights. The documents cited here do not supply a defensible present value for E.

Likewise, subtracting the new $260 million senior facility from the original $685.8 million bank financing does not establish a creditor loss of $425.8 million. That comparison omits allowed claims, new-money uses, creditor equity and timing. It is useful for seeing a financing reset; it is incomplete for measuring a realized loss.

The concession clock began before reorganization

The agreement was executed March 22, 2007. DOT describes a 50-year concession from opening; traffic began in October 2012 and service commenced in November. Bankruptcy didn’t restart that clock.

TxDOT’s amendments include Amendment 21’s bankruptcy stipulation and later renewal-work and technical changes. The company page, checked October 26, 2026, names Strategic Value Partners as majority owner and the federal government as minority owner. Cintra and Zachry have held no stake since 2017. The company’s southern 41 miles remain separate from TxDOT’s northern Segments 1–4.

The remaining cash stream decides the credit

Start with the pledged receipts. Then identify which company owes each debt, the cash needed for operations and renewal, any state revenue share, and the remaining concession term. A creditor can own a claim on a finite stream without owning the public right of way.

I’d underwrite a road from pledged receipts after operations, renewal, debt service, and public revenue sharing, over the concession’s remaining term. SH 130 shows why asphalt can retain its purpose while the financing loses its value.

Sources

  1. U.S. DOT Build America Bureau: SH 130 Segments 5 and 6 project profile

    Original funding, financing hierarchy, filing and emergence dates.

  2. TxDOT: executed SH 130 concession agreement and amendments

    State title, executed date and Amendment 21 bankruptcy stipulation.

  3. SH 130 Concession Company: restructuring plan approved, May 19, 2017

    Primary issuer announcement distributed by PR Newswire; new $260m senior secured facility.

  4. Congressional Research Service: Risks and Rewards of Transportation P3s, September 19, 2017

    Reprint of CRS IF10735; dated federal cash, debt and equity recovery. These are 2017 amounts.

  5. U.S. Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Texas: case 16-10262, document 2, March 2, 2016

    Contemporaneous court filing mirrored by the San Antonio Express-News; pages 4–5 explain distress and requested joint administration.

  6. SH 130 Concession Company: current company and public-title description

    Checked October 26, 2026; reports Strategic Value Partners as majority owner, the federal government as minority holder, and no Cintra or Zachry stake since 2017.

  7. U.S. DOT Build America Bureau, SH 130 Segments 5–6 project profile

    (primary federal financing record). Cost, capital structure, concession, bankruptcy, and U.S. DOT debt and equity recovery.

  8. FHWA, Report on Highway Public-Private Partnership Concessions in the United States, 2016

    (federal analytical report). Original sponsor percentages, revenue-sharing and toll clauses, early forecast shortfall, liquidity stress, and bankruptcy context.

  9. Kentucky Public Pensions Authority, Project Spurs investment recommendation, September 6, 2024

    (public pension investment memorandum; sponsor-derived underlying data). SH 130 65/35 ownership, continuation vehicle, performance, toll escalation, concession term, and restructuring narrative.

Read next