Sell the review before you scale the app

The customer in this example has several suppliers, physical inventory, and one person accountable for a weekly replenishment review. The proposed app joins inventory data to supplier lead times, flags exceptions, and records who will decide by when. Purchasing stays with the merchant. I budget $40,000 for the next six 30-day periods after app approval and development.

Shopify’s inventory reports estimate stock coverage from recent sales. Its purchase-order workflow records suppliers, quantities, and terms, then links orders to transfers for tracking goods. I would judge the new app against a merchant using that workflow well: which purchasing decision still takes too long or goes unmade?

I want the first paid review to expose that decision. Perhaps a supplier exception stays unresolved, an owner misses a reorder, or the merchant needs initial configuration and a clearer procedure. Saving preparation time and improving the purchasing decision create different reasons to pay. I would price the work the customer needs.

The offer promises one store, one weekly review, merchant-supplied lead times, and a record of exceptions and decisions. I would price custom buying or an ERP replacement as its own job. Otherwise each apparent app sale quietly acquires an unpriced service obligation.

The proposed prices are $99 per 30 days for self-service and $399 for assisted direct. The agency offer also costs $399, with 25% of gross app billings going to the agency. I use these as prices to test with buyers.

Suppose four reviews each release an hour of an operator’s time, valued at an assumed $60 an hour. That buys $240 of capacity against a $399 subscription: a $159 gap. I need to find the benefit that pays for the rest, such as an avoided rush purchase or a purchasing decision that previously went unmade.

A salaried operator may use the four hours elsewhere while payroll stays the same. I would judge that freed time by the work it enables. Multiplying a wage by every minute the app touches would overstate the buyer’s gain.

Assistance earns its price when the merchant can complete the next review with less founder interpretation. I would test the native workflow after setup, then ask what the paid product still contributes. A customer who only needed configuration points me toward a setup business. A recurring exception process that keeps earning $399 points me toward software.

One founder has 60 hours per period for onboarding and support after reserving product time. The other has 40 commercial hours. Fixed outflow is $6,000, including $5,000 in founder draws and $1,000 in baseline operations. Each billed store adds $12 of variable cost. I stop at a $10,000 cash reserve.

All three offers use an approved public app and Shopify billing. Public distribution and the App Store requirements apply to direct selling too. Shopify’s revenue-share terms specify a 2.9% processing fee and conditional 0% share on the first $1 million of cumulative gross app revenue earned since January 1, 2025, across associated apps and accounts. I assume eligibility below that threshold and also test a 15% platform share.

The model buys acquisition only for qualified, converted starts the team can accept. Failed commercial work is allocated across customers won. I would close admission when delivery fills: continuing to buy leads would turn apparent channel efficiency into a cash loss.

I reserve support for existing customers before admitting new ones. In self-service period four, that support takes 25.12 hours. Each new store needs 1.5 onboarding hours and 0.75 support hours. Fifteen fit under the 60-hour limit; sixteen overflow it. Twenty potential starts become fifteen paid starts, followed by eleven and eight in the next periods as existing customers claim more time.

The calendar can fail before the hour budget does. Weekly reviews and supplier disruptions can arrive together, leaving the team below sixty hours for the period but late for the decision that made the offer worth buying. I would track the timing of support as closely as its total.

Sixty hours divided by half an hour of support fits 120 active assisted stores before onboarding. I would leave room for churn replacement, unusual incidents, and reviews that arrive together. The engineering job is to remove repeated interpretation while preserving the merchant’s decision. If that interpretation was what the customer purchased, cutting founder hours weakens the offer.

I apply churn before admitting new stores, bill each accepted store for a full period, pay acquisition and variable costs immediately, and receive net collections one period later. Shopify supports 30-day subscriptions; the collection lag is my assumption. Partner payouts depend on merchant payment and payout timing.

Assisted direct produces $27,993 of contribution before fixed outflow. It ends with $21,993 in cash and uses 32.90 delivery hours in period six. Self-service reaches 63.25 expected active stores but ends with $6,927. I prefer the smaller customer base that leaves more cash and room to deliver.

All three offers fall short of funding $36,000 of fixed outflow over the test. Direct leaves an $8,007 contribution gap before collection timing, although its sixth-period contribution exceeds that period’s fixed outflow by $2,940. I would pay that launch bill to test a recurring business, with renewal and support evidence deciding whether to continue.

With five new direct starts taking only fifteen of forty commercial hours in the final periods, I would use the spare time to find merchants willing to pay $399 and test the native substitute before buying a partner’s promise to save sales hours that already sit idle.

Direct starts with four times the self-service price, different retention, and different support. I need those assumptions to survive paid use before calling the winner a channel advantage.

At $99, with its other inputs unchanged, direct ends with $4,649 against self-service’s $6,927. At $399, holding self-service’s demand, churn, and support fixed, self-service ends with $56,048. I read the reversal as a reason to test price and customer fit before spending on distribution.

The pilot has to earn the whole offer: merchants accept the scope and price, renew after understanding it, and make the recurring decision with less founder work. I would spend the next dollar on the observation most likely to change that operating choice.

For each account, I would record store complexity, purchasing frequency, existing tools, accountable buyer, offered scope, and price. Giving one offer to large merchants and another to tiny stores would muddle the comparison. Even a small pilot can reveal a promise that fits the wrong buyer.

The agency case waits two periods for recruitment. A ready, qualified agency changes the result: with four potential starts followed by eight per period, ending cash rises to $28,210 and overtakes direct. I would favor that partner if it brought suitable buyers sooner.

I would pay a 25% commission for qualified demand the founders couldn’t obtain on worthwhile terms. I would judge the partner by paid fit, contribution after renewals, delivery demands, and who owns the relationship. Saving spare commercial hours or introducing bespoke jobs earns less.

The half-hour onboarding and quarter-hour support case accepts all 96 modeled starts yet ends with $4,306, because acquisition spending arrives before enough customer collections. I would treat the delivery improvement as an option to accept more demand, exercising it only after checking that the cash committed to acquisition can reach the company again before the growing customer base needs its next round of support.

Moving direct collections from one to two periods leaves contribution unchanged but cuts ending cash to $13,767. I would manage the launch against payout and receivable records, including holds and nonpayment. Shopify’s Partner Program Agreement makes merchant payment part of that calculation.

I would aim for the modeled three and four assisted starts in the first two periods. Their gross outflow is $13,169, partly offset by collections. That is my budget for learning whether the work deserves a recurring subscription.

For each paid account, I would keep the earlier review, purchasing decision, and time used by merchant and founders, then watch the next review without the founder interpreting every exception, because that is when the product’s recurring contribution has to survive the withdrawal of its most expensive support. A renewal after that test tells me more than enthusiasm during an assisted first session.

At $299, holding the customer path fixed, direct’s sixth-period surplus falls to $433. At $249, it becomes an $820 shortfall. Keeping the $399 price but finding only three new starts per period also leaves period six just below break-even. I would test willingness to pay before trying to onboard my way past that constraint.

Price also changes conversion, customer mix, and support expectations. I would update those connected inputs together when paid evidence arrives. The sensitivity table isolates the arithmetic of price; a launch plan has to describe the buyers who will pay it.

I would start assisted direct, then make the founder less necessary. Paid reviews may earn a recurring exception process or reveal a better setup service. I want that answer while the launch still has cash and time to change course.

A ready agency can win by supplying suitable buyers sooner. Self-service can win when merchants need little help and collections fund acquisition. Bespoke work can support a different price. I would compare each with the purchasing job it can deliver.

I would expand only after paid use survives the native substitute, the next renewal, and the calendar of support. Until then, I would spend spare capacity learning why someone will pay, before paying to find more of them.